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On June 23, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, a case involving the ques-
tion of whether the government’s 
eminent domain power can be 
exercised on behalf of private 
parties to take private homes, 
land, and businesses for private 
commercial development. The 
March 2005 issue of this news-
letter, the feature article focused 
on the case, and predicted that 
the U.S. Supreme Court would 
uphold the Connecticut Supreme 
Court’s approval of the exercise 
of the power on behalf of a pri-
vate party. As expected, the U.S. 
Supreme Court did afﬁ rm the 
lower court. That outcome was 
not surprising — the Court has 
approved such takings for over 
50 years. However, the decision 
has been criticized widely in 
the media and among those less 
familiar with the process of emi-
nent domain and the long line 
of judicial decisions interpreting 
the Fifth Amendment’s “public 
use” requirement.
Some agricultural groups and 
private property advocacy 
groups have begun pushing for 
the Congress to enact legislation 
designed to “protect” the prop-
erty rights that the Kelo opinion 
supposedly has taken away. 
Similar calls have been made 
for states to also enact “correc-
tive” legislation. However, before 
action is taken to reform the 
eminent domain system to pro-
hibit state and local governments 
from using eminent domain for 
economic development pur-
poses, it is important to under-
stand just what Kelo did and did 
not decide; what, if anything, is 
signiﬁ cant about the decision; 
and what policy response, if any, 
should be taken.
The Kelo case and eminent domain -- setting the 
record straight and a proposal for reform
by Roger McEowen, associate professor of agricultural law, (515) 294-4076, 
mceowen@iastate.edu
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Sorting Fact From Distortion — Just What 
Exactly Did Kelo Do?
Clearly, Kelo does not break new ground by autho-
rizing the use of eminent domain solely for eco-
nomic development. The Court has ruled in two 
major cases dating back to 1954 that the practice 
is constitutional. In addition, the Court has upheld 
the use of eminent domain to facilitate agriculture 
and mining because of their importance to the 
states in question. Likewise, the Court has also up-
held the condemnation of trade secrets in order to 
promote economic competition in pesticide mar-
kets. In none of these prior decisions was eminent 
domain exercised because of some “precondemna-
tion use” that inﬂ icted “afﬁ rmative harm.” Indeed, 
Justice Stevens, the author of the Kelo majority 
opinion, concluded that “[p]romoting economic 
development is a traditional and long accepted 
function of government” — surely an irrefutable 
proposition — and that there was “no principled 
way” of distinguishing what the petitioners charac-
terized as economic development “from the other 
public purposes that we have recognized.” So, Kelo
does not expand the government’s power to take 
property when some “harm” to society is not trying 
to be avoided. The Court has authorized such tak-
ings for a long time.
Some have claimed that Kelo authorizes condem-
nations where the only justiﬁ cation is a change 
in use of the property that will create new jobs 
or generate higher tax revenues. That is an incor-
rect reading of the case. While that possibility was 
raised at oral argument, the Court did not have 
to decide whether an isolated taking to produce a 
marginal increase in jobs or tax revenues satisﬁ es 
the Constitution’s “public use” requirement. The 
New London Redevelopment Project at issue in the 
case was designed to do more than simply achieve 
an “upgrade” in the use of one tract of land. In-
deed, the project was also designed to generate a 
number of traditional “public uses,” including a 
renovated marina, a pedestrian riverwalk, the site 
for a new U.S. Coast Guard museum (including 
public parking for the museum), an adjacent state 
park, as well as retail facilities.
Kelo also does not, as some have claimed, dilute 
the standard of review for determining whether a 
particular taking is for a public use. The Court’s 
1984 opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, establishes that the applicable standard 
of review is the same minimum rationality test the 
Court uses in reviewing substantive due process 
and equal protection challenges to economic 
regulation. That standard did not change. Indeed, 
the Court noted that condemnations should be 
reviewed carefully when they result in a private 
retransfer of property, or are not carried out in ac-
cordance with some comprehensive plan. This is 
to ensure that property is not being taken under 
the mere pretext of a public purpose, when the 
actual purpose is to bestow a private beneﬁ t. Im-
portantly, the Court indicated that, in the future, it 
might impose a higher standard of review in public 
use cases. Relatedly, before Kelo, courts merely 
had to ask whether the use of eminent domain 
was “rationally related to a conceivable purpose.” 
After Kelo, courts must determine whether the al-
leged public purpose is a “mere pretext” to justify 
a transfer driven by “impermissible favoritism to 
private parties.” As such, Kelo was a signiﬁ cant 
victory for property rights advocates. That point 
has been obscured completely by the widespread 
criticism of the Court’s opinion.
It is also not clear that the original understand-
ing of the Takings Clause would limit the use of 
eminent domain to cases of government ownership 
or public access. Justice Thomas ﬁ led a separate 
dissenting opinion in Kelo, arguing that the Court 
should return to the original understanding of the 
Takings Clause, but it is unclear what the Framers 
meant by the words “for public use.” The phrase 
“nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation” illustrates that “public 
use” modiﬁ es “taken.” As such, there are various 
subsets of takings — those for public use, and 
those not for public use. But that does not neces-
sarily mean that the Clause requires that a taking 
must be for a “public use.” Perhaps the Fram-
ers were simply describing the type of taking for 
which just compensation must be given — a tak-
continued on page 4
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ing of property by eminent domain as opposed to 
some other type of taking, such as by tort, taxation 
or regulation.
It is also questionable that takings for economic 
development pose a particular threat to “discrete 
and insular minorities,” as Justice Thomas stated 
in his dissenting opinion. Under Justice Thomas’s 
view, and that of the groups that have roundly 
criticized the Kelo opinion, eminent domain 
should be restricted to takings for government 
use or actual use by the public. Any other type of 
real estate development would have to use market 
transactions. However, the high transaction costs 
associated with assembling large tracts of land in 
developed areas result in market-based develop-
ment projects being concentrated at the perimeters 
of urban areas, far from most poor communities. 
Thus, it is doubtful that leaving all commercial real 
estate development to market transactions would 
improve the welfare of poor communities which 
tend to occur most in inner-city urban areas.
Possible Responses to Kelo
Clearly, one possible approach is for the Con-
gress to declare that the use of eminent domain 
for economic development is impermissible. This 
strategy would leave it up to courts to decide 
which exercises of eminent domain are prohibited. 
Unfortunately, courts have proven that they are 
not very good at policing the uses to which emi-
nent domain is put. A better approach is that such 
decisions be exercised by politically accountable 
actors, not courts. Another problem is that this 
approach raises questions about federalism. While 
it is appropriate to correct eminent domain abuses, 
state courts have often eliminated such abuses as a 
matter of state law. Without evidence of a national 
problem of overuse of eminent domain, it is prob-
ably not a good idea for the Congress to take ac-
tion. Another problem of the Congress prohibiting 
the use of eminent domain for private economic 
development is that it helps only property owners 
whose cases fall near the margins of the prohibi-
tion. Those who experience takings regarded as 
clearly permissible — including those whose prop-
erty is taken for new highways, airport expansions, 
public convention centers, and public stadiums 
— get no relief. Also, it will be more difﬁ cult for 
ordinary landowners to ﬁ nd a lawyer to bring an 
action challenging a questionable taking. Many 
condemnation lawyers work on a contingent fee 
basis, and are paid a percentage of any additional 
“just compensation” they obtain from the state 
beyond the state’s initial offer. A no-public use 
action, if it succeeds, means that there will be no 
fund of money with which to pay the lawyer. So, 
the incentive for lawyers to bring and aggressively 
prosecute such actions is diminished.
Alternatively, the decision whether or not to use 
eminent domain could be pushed down to the 
local level with the requirement that the decision 
be made by elected rather than unelected ofﬁ cials. 
Another approach would be to put the burden on 
the condemning authority to establish the legal-
ity of the taking, including whether it constitutes 
a public use, before title changes hands. Many 
jurisdictions today have “quick take” statutes that 
presume the validity of the taking, and require 
condemnee (landowner) to ﬁ le a private action 
seeking to enjoin the taking. This procedure puts 
the burden of proof on the condemnee, includ-
ing the burden of proving that the taking is not a 
public use. That could be changed as a means of 
strengthening landowner rights. Also, it may be 
possible to increase the amount of compensation 
paid to condemnees above the current requirement 
of fair market value.
Suggested Approach
It is important that any legislative action provide 
“relief” to all property owners who experience emi-
nent domain, not just a select few. A strategy that 
provides more money to persons whose property 
is taken by eminent domain accomplishes that ob-
jective and will minimize the actual use of eminent 
domain. Also, eminent domain procedures were 
developed in the nineteenth century and have 
been modiﬁ ed only slightly over time. Under the 
typical approach, a legislative body makes a deci-
sion to condemn property without providing any 
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explanation, with a court then holding a hearing 
to see whether the condemnation meets the court’s 
understanding of the meaning of public use. There 
is typically no detailed proposed project that is set 
forth for public comment and hearings. Disaffected 
persons generally cannot seek judicial review 
concerning the wisdom of the proposed taking. 
Retooling current eminent domain procedures to 
require open, public, participatory inquiries into 
the need for the exercise of eminent domain would 
provide better protection for property owners 
than imposing an abstract deﬁ nition of prohibited 
categories of eminent domain enforced by courts. 
Modernizing the process in this fashion would 
allow the real objections to the project to be ad-
dressed, and would create a mechanism for iden-
tifying a way to proceed that would involve less 
or no use of eminent domain, and would allow 
property owners a forum in which to voice their 
objections to being uprooted. 
Another reform might be to require more complete 
compensation for persons whose property is taken 
by eminent domain. The constitutional standard 
requires fair market value, no more and no less. 
Congress modiﬁ ed this when it passed the Uni-
form Relocation Act in 1970, which requires some 
additional compensation for moving expenses and 
loss of personal property. Congress could modify 
the Relocation Act again, to push the compensa-
tion formula further in the direction of providing 
truly “just” compensation.
Alternatively, Congress could require that when 
a condemnation produces a gain in the underly-
ing land values due to the assembly of multiple 
parcels, some part of the gain must be shared with 
the people whose property is taken. Under current 
law, all of the assembly gain goes to the condemn-
ing authority, or the entity to which the property is 
transferred after the condemnation.
Conclusion
Adjusting the level of just compensation and/or 
reforming the current eminent domain process 
would do more to protect homeowners against 
eminent domain abuses than declaring a federal 
prohibition on takings for economic development.
These techniques would protect all property own-
ers — those whose property is taken for clear 
public uses, as well as those whose property is 
taken for private economic development. More-
over, the “takings” process would remain subject to 
the oversight of attorneys who represent property 
owners in condemnation proceedings. Provid-
ing additional compensation in cases of greatest 
concern would also discourage local governments 
from using eminent domain without barring its 
use altogether. Perhaps most importantly, assur-
ing a more “just” measure of compensation would 
leave the ultimate decision about when to exercise 
the eminent domain power in the hands of local 
elected ofﬁ cials who are politically accountable to 
local voters.
Reprinted with permission of Lone Tree Publishing Co., LLC
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As I look at the issues that cannot be avoid-ed as we prepare to lay the groundwork for a discussion of the shape of the 2007 
Farm Bill, several things come to mind. The ﬁ rst 
is the federal deﬁ cit and the second is the pressure 
that is being put on WTO negotiators to eliminate 
agricultural subsidies. These two factors have the 
potential to signiﬁ cantly affect the nature of the 
2007 Farm Bill discussion.
While these two issues may seem to be unrelated, 
one domestic and the other international, they in 
fact stem from a common cause. If crop prices in 
the 1997-2004 period were at the same level that 
they were in early 1996, we wouldn’t be talking 
about either one. However, because of low market 
prices for the eight major U.S. crops, spending 
on the farm program zoomed to over $20 bil-
lion a year and recently has settled back into the 
mid-teens. Much of the time over the last nine 
years, crop prices have been well below the cost 
of production. When these crops are sold into 
export markets at low prices, farmers and govern-
ments around the world accuse us of dumping 
our excess production on international markets at 
a price that is below the full cost of production. As 
a result we have seen a growing chorus of those 
who, as a part of WTO negotiations, are calling 
for the elimination of all subsidies in the U.S. and 
other developed countries.
The issue that has to be addressed, then, is the 
part that recent U.S. farm policy may have played 
in bringing about these low prices. I would argue 
that the low prices are the consequence of basing 
farm policy on an incorrect set of assumptions 
about the nature of the agricultural sector, particu-
larly crop agriculture. Going into the 1996 Farm 
Bill, it was assumed that 
(1) the agricultural sector behaves more like 
other economic sectors than it did when farm 
programs were ﬁ rst adopted in the 1930s; 
(2) exports are the key to a prosperous US agri-
cultural sector, after all 95 percent of the con-
sumers of food live outside the U.S.; and 
(3) government farm programs are the prob-
lem, not the solution, and if the government 
would get out of the way and allow markets to 
work, U.S. agriculture would be on the road to 
a market-driven prosperity. Let us look at these 
one at a time.
In other economic sectors, low prices stimulate two 
responses—consumers increase their purchases 
while manufacturers reduce production quickly 
returning to industry to proﬁ tability. Low food 
prices, however, do not stimulate consumers to 
increase their food intake from three meals to ﬁ ve 
meals a day. Similarly, it is not in the best interest of 
individual crop farmers to measurably reduce their 
acreage or use of inputs in the face of lower prices. 
Any income they receive above the variable cost of 
production can be put toward the ﬁ xed costs.
U.S. farmers have enjoyed an export driven pros-
perity three times in the last century—WWI, 
WWII, and the mid-to-late 1970s—and none of 
them were triggered by U.S. farm policy instru-
ments. These periods of surging exports lasted a 
total of no more than 14 years out of the last hun-
dred. Most countries view their domestic food pro-
duction in the same way that U.S. residents view 
the military, it is a matter of national security. Most 
nations that have an adequate amount of arable 
land would prefer to grow their own food rather 
than become dependent on imports. The level of 
U.S. exports of crops like corn are more a function 
of production variations in other nations than it is a 
function of price.
Under government farm programs in effect prior 
to the adoption of the 1996 Farm Bill, the non-re-
course loan rate set an effective ﬂ oor on program 
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Updates, continued from page 1
Internet updates
The following updates have been added to www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm.
Decision Tools
Grain Drying Cost Calculator– Use this decision tool to calculate total drying cost per bushel 
based on the type of drying system and price inputs.
Grain Transportation Costs – Use this decision tool to ﬁ nd ownership and operator costs for 
transporting grain by wagon or truck.
Crop Rotation Summary – Use this decision tool to estimate the returns for different crop
rotations.
Livestock Revenue Protection (LRP) Analyzer - Use this decision tool to compare the price risk 
protection available with Livestock Revenue Protection to using futures contracts, put options or 
no price protection.
crop prices by taking production out of the com-
mercial market and placing it into government 
storage. With the extension of Loan Deﬁ ciency 
Payments (LDP) to crops like corn, soybeans, and 
wheat, prices could fall below the loan rate, farm-
ers could collect the difference between the posted 
county price and the loan rate while still retaining 
possession of the crop that could then be sold at 
prices well below the cost of production. A com-
parison of corn prices before and after the imple-
mentation of the FAIR Act shows that for the same 
year-ending stocks-to-use ratio, prices in the post 
1996 period were 34 cents a bushel lower than 
they were when government policy put a ﬂ oor 
on corn prices. Before the adoption of the FAIR 
Act, government policy worked in a manner so as 
to ensure that farmers received the bulk of their 
income from the marketplace and at the same time 
maintained lower government costs. With a ﬂ oor 
on crop prices, other nations had little reason to 
accuse the U.S. of dumping.
If a variation of the pre-1996 farm programs were 
in effect today, crop prices would be higher, gov-
ernment farm program costs would be signiﬁ cantly 
lower, farmers would receive more of their income 
from the marketplace, the volume of our crop 
exports would be virtually the same as it is today, 
the value of our crop exports would be higher, 
and farmers around the world would be receiving 
higher prices for their crops making the accusa-
tions of dumping moot.
For all of their weaknesses, farm policies in effect 
prior to 1996 had fewer negative side effects than 
the policies in effect today. We would contend that 
the reason for this is that the earlier policies took 
into account the unique economic characteristics 
of crop agriculture and were designed to work 
both in periods of stable to declining exports and 
increasing exports.
